\documentclass[10pt]{article}

\usepackage{fullpage}
\usepackage{setspace}
\usepackage{parskip}
\usepackage{titlesec}
\usepackage[section]{placeins}
\usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage{breakcites}
\usepackage{lineno}
\usepackage{hyphenat}





\PassOptionsToPackage{hyphens}{url}
\usepackage[colorlinks = true,
            linkcolor = blue,
            urlcolor  = blue,
            citecolor = blue,
            anchorcolor = blue]{hyperref}
\usepackage{etoolbox}
\makeatletter
\patchcmd\@combinedblfloats{\box\@outputbox}{\unvbox\@outputbox}{}{%
  \errmessage{\noexpand\@combinedblfloats could not be patched}%
}%
\makeatother


\usepackage{natbib}




\renewenvironment{abstract}
  {{\bfseries\noindent{\abstractname}\par\nobreak}\footnotesize}
  {\bigskip}

\titlespacing{\section}{0pt}{*3}{*1}
\titlespacing{\subsection}{0pt}{*2}{*0.5}
\titlespacing{\subsubsection}{0pt}{*1.5}{0pt}


\usepackage{authblk}


\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage[space]{grffile}
\usepackage{latexsym}
\usepackage{textcomp}
\usepackage{longtable}
\usepackage{tabulary}
\usepackage{booktabs,array,multirow}
\usepackage{amsfonts,amsmath,amssymb}
\providecommand\citet{\cite}
\providecommand\citep{\cite}
\providecommand\citealt{\cite}
% You can conditionalize code for latexml or normal latex using this.
\newif\iflatexml\latexmlfalse
\providecommand{\tightlist}{\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt}\setlength{\parskip}{0pt}}%

\AtBeginDocument{\DeclareGraphicsExtensions{.pdf,.PDF,.eps,.EPS,.png,.PNG,.tif,.TIF,.jpg,.JPG,.jpeg,.JPEG}}

\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[english]{babel}



\usepackage{float}








\begin{document}

\title{Where's my consciousness-ometer?~A survey of tests for the presence and
type of consciousness and suggestions for testing General Resonance
Theory against competing theories~}



\author[1]{Tam Hunt}%
\affil[1]{Worldania}%


\vspace{-1em}



  
  \date{May 23, 2024}


\begingroup
\let\center\flushleft
\let\endcenter\endflushleft
\maketitle
\endgroup








\sloppy




\emph{Tools and tests for measuring the presence and type of
consciousness are becoming available, but there is no established
theoretical approach for what these tools are measuring. This paper
looks at various categories of tests for measuring the presence and type
of consciousness and suggests ways in which different theories of
consciousness may be empirically distinguished. We label the various
testable correlates of consciousness as the ``measurable correlates of
consciousness'' (MCC). There are three sub-categories of MCC: 1) Neural
correlates of consciousness (NCC); 2) Behavioral correlates of
consciousness (BCC); 3) Creative correlates of consciousness (CCC). We
also look specifically at ways in which the General Resonance Theory of
consciousness may be tested and compared to other theories like the
Integrated Information Theory of consciousness and Global Workspace
Theory. We suggest additional simplified approaches under the hypothesis
that electrical and magnetic fields are the seat of consciousness. Last,
we reflect on how broader philosophical views about the nature of
consciousness, such as materialism and panpsychism, may also become
scientifically tractable.}

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  \textbf{Introduction}
\end{enumerate}

How can we know if any person, animal or any thing is
\emph{actually~}conscious and not just simulating various aspects of
consciousness? The nature of consciousness makes it by necessity a
wholly private affair (Libet 2005; Koch 2019). The only consciousness I
can know with~\emph{certainty} is my own. Everything else is inference.

How do we create a reliable ``consciousness-ometer'' (what I'll call
a~\emph{psychometer} in the rest of this paper)? This inquiry has been
relegated to philosophical musings until the last few years, but we are
at a juncture where tools for measuring consciousness are starting to
mature. This paper looks at the various kinds of tools and tests
available, how they can be used to test for the presence and type of
consciousness, and makes some suggestions for how a reliable psychometer
could be created and refined over time.

Theories of consciousness are abundant, but often untested or even
untestable (Michel et al. 2019). A major coordinated testing program has
yet to be conducted, but the Templeton World Charity Foundation embarked
in 2019 {[}Fn 1{]} on a multi-year effort to examine a number of the
more prominent theories of consciousness in a series of one-on-one
adversarial experimental tests, with the express intent of
distinguishing the various theories. The first head-to-head contest will
feature Global Neuronal Workspace theory (Dehaene 2014) and the
Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (Oizumi, et al. 2013).

\emph{Footnote 1.~ Limited details are available at Templeton's website
here:~}\href{https://www.templetonworldcharity.org/arc}{\emph{https://www.templetonworldcharity.org/arc}}\emph{.
Additional details on the program and approach are available here:}
\href{https://www.quantamagazine.org/neuroscience-readies-for-a-showdown-over-consciousness-ideas-20190306/}{\emph{https://www.quantamagazine.org/neuroscience-readies-for-a-showdown-over-consciousness-ideas-20190306/}}\emph{.
Additional details were released at an October 2019 announcement:}
\href{https://sci-hub.tw/https://science.sciencemag.org/content/366/6463/293.full}{\emph{https://sci-hub.tw/https://science.sciencemag.org/content/366/6463/293.full}}\emph{.}

In thinking about ways to test theories of consciousness, it is
important to keep in mind at all times that we can't know if any person,
any animal, or anything else at all is actually conscious, rather than a
sophisticated simulation of consciousness. We can and frequently do in
practice, nevertheless, make reasonable inferences about the presence of
other consciousnesses. Libet 2005 agrees: ``{[}S{]}ubjective experience
cannot be directly measured by external objective devices or by external
observations. Conscious subjective experience is accessible only to the
individual having the experience.''

Attempts to assess the presence or nature of consciousness in any
particular circumstance, and related attempts to assess different
theories of consciousness and their predictions, will face the problem
of reasonable inference (abduction) because of this fundamental
limitation on our individual and collective knowledge. But this problem
is surmounted frequently in practice in that we, each of us, reasonably
infer that other people are conscious, based on their behavior and
appearance. The same holds true for pets and many other animals. Testing
for the presence of consciousness throughout the physical world relies
on making similar reasonable inferences.

Koch 2019 (p. 155) makes a similar argument: ``Because you are so
similar to me, I abduce that you too have subjective, phenomenal states.
The same logic applies to other people. Apart from the occasional
solitary solipsist this is uncontroversial.'' Koch proceeds through the
course of his book to offer various ways that scientists may, now and in
the future, test for the presence and character of consciousness in
humans, animals and even non-biological entities -- all based on
abduction (reasonable inference).

We propose in the present paper a general quantification framework that
rests on various ``measurable correlates of consciousness'' (MCC). This
rubric includes the ``neural correlates of consciousness'' and the
related but broader notion of ``behavioral correlates of
consciousness.'' It also includes a newly-coined ``creative correlates
of consciousness'' (CCC) category that is explained below. MCC refers to
any means identified for measuring aspects of consciousness.

This paper identifies various ways in which MCC can be identified and
tested. We also suggest ways for testing and contrasting specific
theories of consciousness, including the General Resonance Theory (GRT)
of consciousness that has been developed by Hunt and Schooler over the
last decade. We also argue that the various metaphysical positions with
respect to the nature of consciousness may, contrary to widespread
opinion on this subject, be tested.

These questions are more than philosophical. With the coming age of
intelligent digital assistants, self-driving cars, and other robots
serving us and increasingly running our lives, does it matter if these
AIs are actually conscious or just simulating consciousness?

More relevant for today's needs, how can we know that coma victims, or
patients in vegetative or minimally conscious states, are conscious or
not? Or if they are likely to recover? How can a family know whether to
take a patient off life support or not, if they don't know with any
certainty what kind of consciousness is or is not present, or is likely
to re-enter over time?

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  \textbf{The Measurable Correlates of Consciousness}
\end{enumerate}

There is a small but growing field looking at how to assess the presence
and even quantity of consciousness in various entities. I've divided
possible tests into three broad categories that comprise collectively
what I call the ``measurable correlates of consciousness'' (MCC) (Fig.
1). The MCC represent all possible scientific measures for inferring the
presence of consciousness. They are ``correlates'' because we can't know
with certainty, as discussed above, whether consciousness is actually
present. We can only infer, based on our measurements and best
judgments. But they, nevertheless, ``measurable,'' and this term is
meant to capture both of these key features.\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{figure}[H]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1.00\columnwidth]{figures/MCC-categories-diagram1/MCC-categories-diagram1}
\caption{{\emph{The various types of measurable correlates of consciousness
(MCC).}
{\label{516866}}%
}}
\end{center}
\end{figure}

Let's look at each of these categories in turn.

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  \textbf{Neural correlates of consciousness and ``signatures of
  consciousness''}
\end{enumerate}

The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have received the most
scientific attention as a means for assessing the presence and type of
consciousness. This term seems to have been coined by Crick and Koch as
part of their quest to determine what parts of the brain are necessary
and sufficient for conscious experience (Crick and Koch 1990; Koch 2004;
Koch 2019).

When, for example, determining whether a vegetative patient is conscious
in any way, we can and do examine the neural correlates of consciousness
only, since there aren't any behaviors to observe and no creative
products either. Various researchers have proposed tests for cognition
and consciousness in coma and vegetative patients.

What's physically going on in the brain in such cases? Neuroimaging
tools such as EEG, MEG, fMRI and TMS (transcranial magnetic
stimulation), each with their own strengths and weaknesses, are able to
provide information on activity happening within the brain even in coma
and~vegetative patients.

Dehaene and his colleagues have identified four ``signatures of
consciousness,'' which extend the idea of neural correlates of
consciousness to more specific aspects of brain activity that are
necessary for conscious awareness, rather than only being correlated
with consciousness (this distinction, however, may be a misunderstanding
of Koch's definition of NCC since Koch's definition is just this).
Dehaene focuses on what's known as the ``P3 wave,'' which is the
positive electric field (measured with EEG) that occurs about 300
milliseconds in the dorsolateral cortex, after a sufficiently strong
stimulus, as the single most important signature of consciousness in
humans. In cortex where stimuli don't result in a P3 wave, Dehaene et
al. suggest that this activity does not reach the level of
consciousness. In tests of vegetative and minimally conscious patients,
he and his colleagues have successfully predicted which patients are
most likely to regain more normal states of consciousness.

Sid Kouider, another French neuroscientist, has examined very young
babies in order to assess the likelihood of them being conscious, using
a similar set of signatures of consciousness as Dehaene and his
colleagues. He concludes (it would be surprising if he hadn't come to
this conclusion) that even newborns are conscious in various complex
ways.

Casarotto et al. 2015 measure a Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI) as
a simpler proxy for consciousness conceived as integrated information.
Tononi is a coauthor on this paper and Tononi's Integrated Information
Theory (IIT) is widely considered to be one of the more convincing
extant theories of consciousness. IIT suggests that integrated
information is consciousness, though in its most recent formulation
consciousness is instead considered to be identical to the
maximally-integrated causal \_\_\_ (``MICE''), \emph{see} Koch 2019;
Oizumi, et al. 2014.

Tononi and his colleagues acknowledge that measuring MICE or integrated
information (\(\Phi\)) in any biologically-complex context is
extremely difficult. The PCI was developed as a more tractable means for
measuring mammalian brain activity and relies on quantification of
electrical activity with sophisticated EEG during transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) of the brain. PCI is a measure of elasticity of
neurons and neuron complexes under perturbation by TMS. It is thought
that the less elastic a neuron is the more it is firing and thus
contributing to consciousness (Casarotto et al. 2015): ``PCI offers a
reliable, independently validated stratification of unresponsive
patients that has important physiopathological and therapeutic
implications. {[}We found that{]} the high-PCI subgroup of VS patients
may retain a capacity for consciousness that is not expressed in
behavior.''

The PCI measures interconnectedness between different parts of the
brain, and activity within those information pathways: ``PCI directly
gauges the ability of many functionally specialized modules of the
thalamocortical system (differentiation) to interact rapidly and
effectively (integration), thus producing complex patterns of
activity.'' (Id.)

Some researchers, such as Koch 2019, view the PCI measure as an
effective but far from perfect psychometer even in its current state.
Koch elaborates on his views on PCI in his 2019 book, \emph{The Feeling
Of Life Itself} , worth quoting at length (Koch 2019, p. 104)\emph{:}

\begin{quote}
Zap-and-zip {[}the colloquial name for the PCI technique{]} does not
measure integrated information. While the PCI index is motivated by IIT,
it crudely estimates differentiation and integration. \emph{Pace} IIT, a
genuine consciousness meter should measure\(\Phi\)max. Such a
\(\Phi\)-meter or phi-meter must causally probe the NCC at the
relevant level of spatiotemporal granularity that maximizes integrated
information. This can be assessed empirically. A true phi-meter should
reflect the waxing and waning of experience during wakefulness and
sleep, how consciousness increases in children and teenagers until it
reaches its zenith in mature adults with a highly developed sense of
self, with, perhaps, an absolute maximum on long-term meditators, before
it begins its inevitable decline with age. Such a device would
generalize across species, whether or not they have a cortex, or,
indeed, any sort of sophisticated nervous system. For now, we are far
from such a tool. In the interim, let us celebrate this milestone in the
millennia-old mind-body problem.
\end{quote}

In sum, PCI and ``zap-and-zip'' arguably represent a high-water mark for
current efforts to measure complex consciousness, and yet PCI remains a
relatively crude measure.

Looking to the evolution of consciousness, and what it takes to enjoy
consciousness in a form resembling human consciousness, Feinberg and
Mallatt 2016 presents a theory of consciousness, which they call the
theory of ``neurobiological naturalism. They argue the following
features are necessary for the presence of consciousness: 1) living
processes; 2) multicellularity with a nervous system and a basic core
brain; 3) ``numerous and neurobiologically unique special
neurobiological features of complex nervous systems.'' The authors
conclude that consciousness is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging
from the explosion of animal complexity in the Cambrian Explosion around
540 million years ago. This theory is so obviously contingent and
tautological, offering no explanation as to why these specific features
are necessary for consciousness, that I shall not dwell on it further.

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  \textbf{Behavioral correlates of consciousness}
\end{enumerate}

The behavioral correlates of consciousness (BCC) are a more intuitive
and more common manner of assessing the presence and type of
consciousness in everyday life and even in a clinical setting. When
measuring NCC is not an option, we need to consider behavioral
correlates as clues for the presence and type of consciousness. As with
measures of the NCC there is no established methodology for using BCC as
a measure(s) of consciousness.

At the most general level, we as humans assess the presence and type of
consciousness present in other humans multiple times per day through
conversations with other humans. Speech and other forms of direct
communication are a type of BCC. Because each us uses speech to convey
our own thoughts and feelings too often to keep track of we also accept
that other humans expressing complex, or even simple, thoughts and
feelings through the use of speech are in fact conscious in ways very
similar to ourselves. This statement is not revelatory but it is
important to state as a baseline approach for assessing the presence of
consciousness.

In the AI context and simulation of consciousness -- independent of
deeper questions about whether AIs can ever be truly conscious rather
than merely simulating it, the well-known Turing Test (described as
``the imitation game'' by Turing himself, Turing 1950) is meant to allow
humans to judge the degree of thinking ability (what we would today
describe as consciousness), if any, in an AI. The Turing Test was
originally proposed to allow human participants to make a specific
judgment based on responses from the test subject about the nature of
the subject: could it really think? Was it a human or a machine? The
Turing Test is a way of using BCC to assess the presence and type of
consciousness in AIs through direct communications.

The BCC encompass far more than forms of communication, however.

Cats cannot communicate their states of consciousness with words. The
brain architecture in cats is quite different from humans and they have
very minimal prefrontal cortex, which is thought to be the center of
many higher-order activities of the human brain. But is prefrontal
cortex necessary for consciousness?

Cat behavior is complex and readily mappable onto human behavior in many
ways. The fact that cats purr, flex their toes and snuggle when petted,
in similar ways to humans demonstrating pleasure when physically
stimulated (minus the purrs, of course), meow loudly for food when
hungry, and stop meowing when fed, demonstrate curiosity or fear about
other cats or humans with various types of body language, and many other
behaviors that we can easily observe ourselves if we have cats as pets,
is fairly convincing evidence, for most of us, that cats are indeed
conscious and have a rich emotional life.

LeDoux 2019 argues for a conservative approach to BCC. He argues that
the default position for making any determinations about the presence of
consciousness should, if possible, explain behaviors without inferring a
role for consciousness. I advocate a less conservative view below, which
is part of the more recent progressive trend toward treating the study
of animal minds in the same or similar ways as we do human minds. This
trend is itself based primarily on the obvious strong kinship and
similarities between humans and other animals, as well as the
well-established fact that biological change occurs slowly and
incrementally, abhorring ``jumps.''

Donald R. Griffin has examined the nature of animal minds in various
works, including his 2001 book, \emph{Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to
Consciousness} , in which he states (Griffin 2001, p. xiii): ``In a
sharp break with the traditional conviction that the mental experiences
of animals cannot be studied scientifically, some of us have begun to
try.'' There is now a relatively long history of examining the nature of
consciousness in animals and the 20th Century ``controversy'' over
discussions of animal or even human minds, and the soft taboo about
studying the mind directly, has justifiably receded into the distance.

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  \textbf{Creative correlates of consciousness}
\end{enumerate}

Creative output is another source of data for assessing the presence of
consciousness. If for whatever reason we can't examine neural or
behavioral correlates of consciousness, we may be able to examine the
creative products of consciousness (CCC) for clues. Additionally, in any
circumstance where the presence of consciousness is in doubt it will be
beneficial to use as many tests of consciousness as are available,
including NCC, BCC and CCC.

For example, when we examine ancient architectural structures such as
Stonehenge or other megalithic structures, or cave paintings in Europe
that have been judged to be as much as 65,000 years old, are we
reasonable in judging the creators of these items to be conscious in
ways similar to our own? Most of us would say: obviously, yes. We know
from experience that it would take high intelligence and consciousness
to produce such items today, so we reasonably infer that our ancient
ancestors had similar levels of consciousness.

What if we find obviously unnatural artifacts on Mars or other bodies in
our solar system? Do we reasonably infer that whatever entities created
such artifacts were conscious? It will depend on the artifacts in
question, but if we were to find anything remotely similar to human
dwellings or machinery on other planets, but which was clearly not human
in origin, most of us would reasonably infer that the creators of these
artifacts were also conscious.

Closer to home, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has produced increasingly
impressive art, with one piece fetching over \$400,000 at a 2018 art
auction. At what point do reasonable people conclude that sophisticated
art creation suggests the presence of some kind of consciousness? To
answer this question empirically, we could conduct a kind of ``artistic
Turing Test'' and ask study participants to consider various works of
art and say which ones they conclude must have been created by a human.
And if AI artwork consistently fools people into thinking it was made by
a human, is that good evidence to conclude that the AI is at least in
some ways conscious?

I reserve judgment on this issue for now, but as a general observation I
agree with Koch 2019 that any AI instantiated in a von Neumann
``feedforward'' type of computer, which has no feedback processes
built-in, as are prevalent in brains, it is highly unlikely that any
complex consciousness will be present in any AI that is otherwise
impressive in its achievements.

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  \textbf{How do we develop a reliable psychometer?}
\end{enumerate}

There is not yet any widely-accepted or reliable psychometer, and
probably never will be a single device that reliably measures the
capacity for consciousness in all circumstances. But various researchers
have suggested ideas, including Dehaene, Changeux, Tononi, Koch,
Cassarotto, and others.

Demertzi admonishes when assessing the presence of consciousness:
``Finding reliable markers indicating the presence or absence of
consciousness represents an outstanding open problem for science.''
(Demertzi et al. 2019). Demertzi and colleagues, and various other
researchers have been working to identify reliable markers, but this is
still, as we have seen, a nascent field.

Dehaene 2014 states the problem clearly (p. 211): ``{[}C{]}ould any
brain image ever prove or disprove the existence of a mind?'' He answers
this question in the affirmative, with various discussions about the
neural correlates of consciousness and ``signatures of consciousness''
(what he considers to be the necessary and sufficient correlates of
consciousness), but also recognizes that (p. 214) ``no single test will
ever prove, once and for all, whether consciousness is present.'' He
instead recommends a battery of tests be developed to give more
confidence about the presence of consciousness in various contexts. His
work is focused on human subjects but he also discusses animal
consciousness in his book. The present paper is focused on a theoretical
framework for measuring the capacity for consciousness in any physical
structures.

Neuroscientist~Giulio Tononi~and his colleague Christof Koch, as
discussed above,~focus on measuring MICE and ``integrated information''
as a proxy for measuring the capacity for consciousness. This theory
suggests that anything that integrates at least one bit of information
has at least a tiny amount of consciousness. A light diode, for example,
contains one bit of information and thus has the most rudimentary type
of consciousness. With just two possible states, on or off, however,
it's a rather uninteresting kind of consciousness.

Koch 2019, accepting IIT as the best working theory of consciousness
extant, raises the possibility of panpsychism expressly, worth quoting
at length (Koch 2019 p. 160):

\begin{quote}
To the extent that I'm discussing the mental with respect to single-cell
organisms let alone atoms, I have entered the realm of pure speculation,
something I have been trained all my life as a scientist to avoid. Yet
three considerations prompt me to cast caution to the wind. First, these
ideas are straightforward extensions of IIT -- constructed to explain
human-level consciousness---to vastly different aspects of physical
reality. This is one of the hallmarks of a powerful scientific
theory---predicting phenomena by extrapolating to conditions far from
the theory's original remit. There are many precedents---that the
passage of time depends on how fast you travel, that spacetime can break
down at singularities known as black holes, that people, butterflies,
vegetables, and the bacteria in your gut use the same mechanism to store
and copy their genetic information, and so on. Second, I admire the
elegance and beauty of this prediction. The mental does not appear
abruptly out of the physical. As Leibniz expressed it,\emph{natura no
facit saltus} , or nature does not make sudden leaps (Leibniz was, after
all, the co-inventor of infinitesimal calculs). The absence of
discontinuities is also a bedrock element of Darwinian thought.
Intrinsic causal power does away with the challenge of how mind emerges
from matter. IIT stipulates that it is there all along.
\end{quote}

In my work on General Resonance Theory (GRT) (Hunt 2011, Schooler, Hunt
and Schooler 2011, Hunt 2014a, Hunt 2014b Hunt 2019), my collaborators
and I share this~``panpsychist'' foundation with IIT and other
panpsychist theories of consciousness. Indeed, Koch wrote the foreword
to Hunt 2014b. I accept as a working hypothesis that~any physical system
has some associated consciousness, however small it may be in the vast
majority of cases.

Rather than integrated information as the key measure of consciousness,
however,~GRT focuses on resonance and synchronization~and the degree to
which parts of a whole resonate at the same or similar frequencies.
Resonance in the case of the human brain generally means shared electric
field oscillation rates, such as gamma band synchrony (40-120 Hertz) as
one example. (Hunt and Schooler 2019 also speculates that quantum
resonance may also play a role in human and other mammalian
consciousness, in an interplay with electric field resonance).

A psychometer developed pursuant to GRT would, insofar as it focuses on
neural correlates of consciousness, look at the degree of
shared~resonance of various types (Hunt and Schooler 2019, Hunt 2019b),
and resulting information/energy~flows, as the measure of consciousness.
Humans and other mammals enjoy a particularly rich kind of
consciousness, because there are many~levels~of pervasive shared
synchronization throughout the brain, nervous system and body (Hunt
2019c). {[}Fn 2{]}

\emph{Footnote 2. Information is generally defined as a subjective
aspect of the physical world, whereas energy is an objective aspect; but
in this context I am using these terms interchangeably because I define
information as aspects of energy that we can measure. As such, all
physical dynamics consist of nothing more than energy flows, but those
energy flows that we can measure may be labeled ``information'' and
quantified under established information theoretic concepts. I will,
however, generally refer to ``information/energy flows'' simply as
``information flows'' from now on in this paper, for simplicity's sake.}

In our framework more generally, we propose a ``weight of the evidence''
approach to assessing the presence and nature of consciousness in any
particular object of study. We pose a number of ``questions,'' in all
areas of the MCC as described above, to the object of study and it
answers in whatever ways it can. Questions can be verbal in nature, or
physical probes, or any kind of interaction between the tester and the
testee. Based on whatever responses are received, we then make the same
kinds of reasonable inferences about the presence and nature of
consciousness that we do every day, implicitly, when it comes to other
humans or animals.

This question and answer process is meant to be truly general and may
apply to any candidate for consciousness, whether it is a human, animal,
plant, bacterium, AI or any physical object.

The logical chain of this framework is straightforward: I know I'm
conscious; I assume other humans are conscious because they act in
various ways like me and do many intelligent things; I engage in similar
reasonable inferences when assessing whether various animals are
conscious and to what degree; we can use the same process of reasonable
inference all the way down the chain of physical complexity. Figure 2
summarizes this approach.

Figure 2. \emph{Summary of the suggested approach for assessing the
presence and nature of consciousness in any physical structures.}\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{figure}[H]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1.00\columnwidth]{figures/image2/image2}

\end{center}
\end{figure}

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  \textbf{Specific tests for General Resonance Theory}
\end{enumerate}

General Resonance Theory (GRT) makes a number of assertions about the
nature of consciousness, which we describe as conjectures. These
conjectures focus on the central feature of GRT: that the combination of
consciousness results from shared resonance between constituents.

Testing the GRT framework should focus initially on the three
conjectures in our Figure 2. This approach follows the Lakatosian
research program (Lakatos 1968) that focuses on testing the ``hard
core'' principles of any given theory. There are many aspects of GRT
that could be tested, and presumably will be over time, but the three
stated conjectures of General Resonance Theory at this juncture are
(Hunt and Schooler 2019):

\begin{quote}
Conjecture 1: Shared resonance is what leads to the combination of
micro-conscious entities into macro-conscious entities (``the shared
resonance conjecture'')

Conjecture 2: The boundaries of a macro-conscious entity depend on the
velocity and frequency of the resonance chains connecting its
constituents (``the boundary conjecture'')

Conjecture 3: Any biological macro-conscious entity will have various
levels of subsidiary/nested micro- and macro-conscious entities (``the
nested consciousness conjecture'')
\end{quote}

Our conjectures may be tested by using various MCCs to discern the
information/energy processing characteristics associated with known
conscious states and comparing these to lower-complexity systems. It may
be especially useful to examine minimally conscious states (as induced
by drugs or sleep) since these provide a boundary condition for the
minimal requirements for consciousness. I introduce now possible testing
paradigms for each conjecture and later delve into more detail.

If shared resonance underpins the combination of consciousness
(Conjecture 1, the shared resonance conjecture), then various
macro-resonance chains should be observed in conscious but not
unconscious states. For example, the P3 wave that Dehaene and colleagues
suggest is one of the key signatures of consciousness is an example of
the macro-resonance (long-range) chain that we would expect to be
observed in conscious states but not in subconscious or pre-conscious
states. In this manner, GWT and GRT are aligned.

If the spatial boundaries of macro-conscious entities depend on the
velocity and frequency of resonance chains (Conjecture 2, the boundary
conjecture), then this should be reflected in differential access to
specific information that is spatially and temporally accessible within
the cycle time of each information pathway examined. For example, if
gamma synchrony is key for human consciousness (it's not that simple, we
know now, but for the sake of example) then the cycle time for gamma
synchrony is at most 1/25th of a second (40 Hz).

Accordingly, any stimuli presented for a time period less than 1/25th of
a second would not enter consciousness. This example ignores the fact
that gamma synchrony extends up to 120 Hz and higher, depending on what
definition we go with, which would allow finer duration stimuli to also
enter consciousness to the degree that the particular variety of gamma
frequency observed exceeded 40 Hz.

Similarly, 40 Hz electrical oscillations entail a velocity of wave
propagation of approximately 1.4 m/s (the velocity of the electric field
itself is far faster, as we'll see below), we obtain 0.035 meters per
cycle for the maximum distance for new information to become part of the
next moment of consciousness (as Bahramisharif et al. 2013 states,
velocity figures for various kinds of wave propagation in cortex are
generally still quite provisional since the science in this area is
still new). Table 1 presents various energy pathway (resonance chain)
velocities, frequencies and distances traveled in each cycle, organized
from fastest to slowest velocity.

Table 1. \emph{Various energy/information pathway velocities and
frequencies in mammal brains.}\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}llll@{}}
\toprule
\textbf{Energy pathway} & \textbf{Velocity} & \textbf{Frequency} &
\textbf{Distance traveled per cycle}\tabularnewline
\midrule
\endhead
Terahertz-level tubulin resonance (Craddock et al. 2017) & Possibly
\textgreater{} c & 613 THz & 0.0049 m\tabularnewline
Electrochemical pulses through axons (Siegel and Sapru 2019) & 80-120
m/s & Various & Various\tabularnewline
Gamma waves in human whole brain & 10 m/s & \textasciitilde{}40 Hz &
0.25 m\tabularnewline
Theta waves in human whole brain (Zhang and Jacobs 2015) & 3 m/s &
\textasciitilde{}5 Hz & 0.6 m\tabularnewline
Beta waves in human whole brain (Takahashi et al. 2011) & 0.23 m/s &
\textasciitilde{}25 Hz & 0.0092 m\tabularnewline
Weak electric fields (``ephaptic coupling'') (Chiang et al. 2019) & 0.1
m/s & \textless{}1 Hz & \textasciitilde{}0.1 m\tabularnewline
Gap junction sharp wave ``ripples'' in mouse brain (Maier et al. 2003) &
0.016 m/s & 200 Hz & 0.00008 m\tabularnewline
\bottomrule
\end{longtable}

Finally, if lower-level organizational systems combine into various
nested states of consciousness (Conjecture 3, the nested consciousness
conjecture), then the synchronization and information integration
characteristics between one level to the next at various levels of
organization should resemble in key ways those that are associated with
the arising of dominant conscious states in humans and other mammals.

Testing Conjecture 3 adequately will depend on further development of
techniques for assessing information/energy flows between levels of
consciousness, which are presumed in our model to be based on different
temporal and spatial scales of neural, neurobiological and physical
processing. Although much work needs to be done in this regard, I am
encouraged by the information processing approaches developed in the IIT
model (Oizumi, et al. 2013), and related information quantification
approaches like causal density and neural complexity (Arsiwalla and
Verschure 2018; Seth, Barrett, Barnett, 2011)).

I also suspect that other models of information extraction/integration
may prove helpful. For example, Fanelli 2019 offers a formal universal
model of information compression that might be used to characterize the
information/energy extraction associated with minimally conscious
states. This compression value might then be used to examine types of
information flows at lower levels of complexity. A prediction of
Conjecture 3 is that information compression values should be similar in
some ways throughout the various organizational levels of conscious
entities.

\begin{enumerate}
\tightlist
\item
  \textbf{Additional thoughts on field theories of consciousness}
\end{enumerate}

One possibility that arises within GRT and some other theories of
consciousness is that consciousness actually resides primarily within
the various electromagnetic fields generated by matter (Jones 2013,
McFadden 2002a, 2002b, 2013; Pockett 2000, 2012; John 2001). It is in
animals, and particularly mammals with complex brains, that such fields
are most pronounced and most complex, resulting in a concomitantly rich
consciousness.

EEG, MEG and other electrical or magnetic field measuring devices are
expressly measuring these fields that are produced by the brain and body
that supports it. There is a long and rich tradition of EEG and MEG
measurements but little consensus over what exactly these devices are
measuring. As mentioned above, a number of thinkers have suggested that
these fields are not epiphenomena or indirect products of the mechanisms
of consciousness, but are instead the actual seat of consciousness. As
such, measuring these fields constitute direct measurements of
consciousness, but from the outside. We are only starting to learn what
the various frequencies and patterns of electrical and magnetic activity
mean in terms of conscious experience.

If consciousness is primarily associated with EM fields (other fields
would also have some associated consciousness, but less rich in
proportion to the complexity and speed of the field at issue), more
specific and perhaps more simple testing paradigms become possible.

If we accept the hypothesis that EEG and MEG are measuring the direct
mechanisms of consciousness we may use existing tools and techniques to
quantify and characterize the various types of brain waves, and nested
and non-nested harmonics present within brain waves, as a way to measure
resonance/consciousness directly. This approach moots any need to
collect data on the trillions of interconnections between neurons, or to
ponder what other types of connections may be present and impactful.
Instead, such an approach makes measurement of even complex mammalian
consciousness tractable using existing tools and techniques.

\textbf{References}

Arsiwalla,~X.~D., \& Verschure,~P. (2018). Measuring the Complexity of
Consciousness.~\emph{Frontiers in Neuroscience} ,~\emph{12} .
doi:10.3389/fnins.2018.00424

Bandyopadhyay, A. (2019, June 15), \emph{Resonance chains and new models
of the neuron} . Retrieved from:
https://medium.com/@aramis720/resonance-chains-and-new-models-of-the-neuron-7dd82a5a7c3a.

Casarotto, S., Comanducci, A., Rosanova, M., Sarasso, S., Fecchio, M.,
Napolitani, M., . . . Massimini, M. (2016). Stratification of
unresponsive patients by an independently validated index of brain
complexity.~\emph{Annals of Neurology,80} (5), 718-729.
doi:10.1002/ana.24779

Crick, F. and Koch, C. ``Towards a Neurobiological Theory of
Consciousness.'' 1990.

Dehaene,~S. (2014).~\emph{Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How
the Brain Codes Our Thoughts} . London, England: Penguin.

Demertzi, A. et al. Human consciousness is supported by dynamic complex
patterns of brain signal coordination.~\emph{Sci. Adv.} ~\textbf{5} ,
1--12 (2019).

Fanelli D. 2019 A theory and methodology to quantify
knowledge.\emph{Royal Society Open Science} . 6: 181055.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181055

Feinberg, T. E., \& Mallatt, J. (2016). The nature of primary
consciousness. A new synthesis.~\emph{Consciousness and Cognition}
,~\emph{43} , 113--127. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.05.009

Griffin, D. R. (2001).~\emph{Animal minds} . Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

Hunt, T. (2011) Kicking the Psychophysical Laws into Gear A New Approach
to the Combination Problem.~\emph{Journal of Consciousness Studies} ~18
(11-12):11-12.

Hunt, T. (2014a) \emph{Eco, Ego, Eros: Essays on Philosophy,
Spirituality and Science.} Santa Barbara: Aramis Press.

Hunt, T. 2014b. Taking time seriously in Integrated Information Theory.

\emph{Journal of Consciousness Studies.}

Hunt, T. (2019, manuscript under peer review) Calculating spatial
boundaries and the capacity for phenomenal consciousness of conscious
resonating structures in General Resonance Theory.

Hunt 2019b. ``Resonance and process philosophy.'' Online at:
https://medium.com/@aramis720/resonance-and-process-philosophy-e5b801045ca6.
Accessed 11/11/19.

Jones, M. (2013), ``Electromagnetic-Field theories of
Mind'',\emph{Journal of Consciousness Studies} ,

\textbf{20} (11-120) pp. 124-49.

John, E.R. (2001) A field theory of consciousness, Consciousness \&
Cognition, 10, pp. 184--213.

Lakatos, I. (1968). ''Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes.''~\emph{Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}
~\textbf{69} (1):149--186 (1968).

LeDoux, J. 2019. The Deep History of Ourselves.

Libet, B. (2005).~\emph{Mind time: the temporal factor in consciousness}
. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Koch,~C. (2004).~\emph{The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological
Approach} . Roberts Publishers.

Koch, C. (2014). Is Consciousness Universal? Online at:
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-consciousness-universal/.
Accessed March 2019.

Koch, C. (2019).~\emph{The feeling of life itself. Why consciousness is
widespread but cant be computed} . Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Kouider, S., Stahlhut, C., Gelskov, S. V., Barbosa, L. S., Dutat, M.,
Gardelle, V. D., \ldots{} Dehaene-Lambertz, G. (2013). A Neural Marker
of Perceptual Consciousness in Infants.~\emph{Science} ,~\emph{340}
(6130), 376--380. doi: 10.1126/science.1232509

McFadden, J. (2001).~\emph{Quantum evolution: Life in the multiverse} .
New York: Norton.

McFadden, J. (2002b) The Conscious Electromagnetic Information (Cemi)
Field Theory: The hard problem made easy? Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 9 (8), pp. 45--60.

McFadden, J. (2002c) Synchronous firing and its influence on the brain's
electromagnetic field: Evidence for an electromagnetic field theory of
consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 (4), pp. 23--50.

McFadden, J. (2013) The CEMI Field Theory: Closing the loop. Journal of
Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2), 153-168.

Michel, M., Beck, D., Block, N.~\emph{et al.} ~Opportunities and
challenges for a maturing science of consciousness.~\emph{Nat Hum Behav}
~\textbf{3,~} 104--107 (2019) doi:10.1038/s41562-019-0531-8

Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., \& Tononi, G. (2014). From the Phenomenology
to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory
3.0.~\emph{PLoS Computational Biology,10} (5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588

Pockett, S. (2000) The Nature of Consciousness, San Jose, CA:Writers
Club Press.

Pockett, S. (2012). The Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness: A
testable hypothesis about the characteristics of conscious as opposed to
non-conscious fields.

Schooler J.W., Hunt T., Schooler J.N. (2011) Reconsidering the
Metaphysics of Science from the Inside Out. In: Walach H., Schmidt S.,
Jonas W. (eds) Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality. Studies in
Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, vol 1. Springer,
Dordrecht.

Turing, A. 1950. Computing machinery and intelligence.

Seth A. K., Barrett, B., and Barnett L. (2011) Causal density and
integrated information as measures of conscious level. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and
Engineering Sciences.

\selectlanguage{english}
\FloatBarrier
\end{document}

