The alternative futures
We identify the following four drivers
of a growing offshore Blue Economy that will determine how developments
evolve (Fig. 2 and Table S1). Firstly, Governance will guide
decision making over common marine resources (Haward and Vince 2008;
Campbell et al. 2016; Haas et al. 2020). Secondly, Research and
Innovation will influence the nature and scope of offshore developments
and their ability to address global issues (e.g. pollution and climate
change; Rockström et al. 2017; Vince and Hardesty 2017).
Thirdly, (instrumental and intrinsic) Values of the Oceanwill influence social preferences around offshore development (Jamieson
2008; Gee 2010; Bidwell 2017). Finally, Partnerships between
economic sectors and between nations, along with institutions regulating
developments, will determine investment strategies and the degree of
knowledge being shared (Campbell et al. 2016; Bebbington et al. 2019;
Bennett et al. 2019; Laffoley et al. 2019). These drivers, or
facilitating mechanisms, interact with each other. For example, decision
making around environmental sustainability could incentivise the
development of new clean technologies and implement evidence-based
co-management arrangements (Armitage et al. 2009).
As positive changes and interactions between these drivers enable
sustainable development, the offshore Blue Economy has the potential to
contribute to multiple SDGs (High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean
Economy 2019). It has the greatest potential to contribute to SDG 7
(Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth),
SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), SDG 12 (Responsible
Consumption and Production), SDG 14 (Life Below Water), SDG 16 (Peace,
Justice and Strong Institutions) and SDG 17 (Partnership for the Goals)
(see Fig 2 and Table 1 for a description of the alternative futures in
relation to drivers and SDGs; see Table S1 for more details). The
offshore Blue Economy also plays a key role in meeting SDG 2 (Zero
Hunger), SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) and SDG 15 (Climate Actions), but
see Farmery et al 2020, Alexander et al 2020 and Trebilco et al 2020 for
a thorough consideration of these topics in the context of the Future
Seas special issues.
1. Business as usual
In the business as usual future the growth oriented economic model
continues to emphasise profit and GDP growth, the commodification of
nature, the dominance of private over public and cultural interests, and
the prioritisation of the interests of current over future generations
(Carmody 2012). Economic growth is centred in high-income,
high-consumption countries. Low-income countries face many social and
economic barriers in transitioning to sustainability, and this often
results in unrestricted and unsustainable resource extraction (Jamieson
2008). Alternative economic models, such as well-being, degrowth, and
the circular economy are attracting increasing recognition as being
necessary to achieve the SDGs (Hadjimichael 2018; Schroeder et al. 2019;
Ertör and Hadjimichael 2020), but their implementation remains marginal.
For instance, the circular economy, where excessive waste generation is
avoided and unavoidable waste becomes a resource (Lacy and Rutqvist
2016), is selectively implemented in relation to plastic pollution and
restricted aspects of food production (Table 1 and S1).
Offshore activities are corporatized and resource ownership highly
concentrated. Companies are granted private or leasehold rights to
access offshore resources under legal frameworks that silo development
considerations. As such, opportunities to address cumulative effects are
missed and ultimately conservation is undermined. Low effective
corporate taxation and inadequate mechanisms for capturing and
redistributing benefits mean that inequities persist, and wealth is
further concentrated. At the same time, the growing trend of globally
sustainable and responsible investments continues to develop (Global
Sustainable Investment Alliance 2018). While these investments are
effective and come to dominate markets in affluent nations, they remain
mostly restricted to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Europe, UK, Japan
and the United States (Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 2018).
Other high-income countries, such as Singapore, Israel, South Korea and
South Africa may follow suit.
Declining inshore options drives technological innovation thus advancing
the capacity to operate in offshore environments. While some locations
undergo a pulse of development, economically viable offshore operations
for emergent industries in other locations is slower than anticipated
due to the need to work in a remote, harsh and poorly understood
environment. This is mirrored more broadly in the slow progress made in
developing sustainable solutions for offshore areas, which is (in part)
driven by the tendency of society to look to offshore alternatives only
when land based solutions reach breaking point. Slow progress is also
due to our failure to gain knowledge and think strategically about
cumulative and intergenerational impacts (Halpern et al. 2019). The lack
of societal concern is because the offshore is ‘out of sight and out of
mind’ and, generally, there is poor reflection upon the values of
offshore areas (Heidenreich 2016).
Monitoring and reporting requirements are fragmented and inconsistent
because it is often unclear what newer industries can deliver and
regulatory incentives and enforcement thus lag behind development. While
smaller sectors that are in an early development stage may see benefits
in information sharing, their resource monitoring and reporting capacity
is small. Larger sectors are less inclined to share data due to company
ownership structures and concern over losing competitive advantage
(Duch-brown and Mueller-langer 2017). For example, data collected during
exploration to assess the economic potential of offshore resources are
rarely made readily available or are only partially shared. This
prevents full cataloguing of baseline ecological functions, delays
policy and regulatory development and hampers the growth of sustainable
ocean business which requires this information (Durden et al. 2018;
Glover et al. 2018; Jones et al. 2019; UN Global Compact 2020).
Limited data transparency and knowledge sharing means that much research
and innovation occurs in isolation (Duch-brown and Mueller-langer 2017).
The benefits of innovation are concentrated in a small number of
countries and profitable companies and investors. Deployment of offshore
renewable energy, in particular offshore wind, continues to grow, with
growth rates of nearly 30% per year between 2010 and 2018
(International Energy Agency 2019). This growth is predominantly seen in
the UK, EU and China. However in other jurisdictions, despite
significant available resource, growth of offshore wind is less rapid.
Challenges surrounding the capacity of the grid to cater for large
growth in offshore generation (Business Network for Offshore Wind, 2019)
or a yet to be established supply chain (Poulsen and Lima 2017) are
slowing development of the industry. This leads to a patchy uptake of
offshore renewables, and sub-optimal benefits in terms of
decarbonisation efforts (International Energy Agency 2019).
The growing cost of deteriorating ocean health, such as the cost of
plastic pollution to the tourism industry (Krelling et al. 2017),
encourages greater engagement with sustainability. Other efforts to
reduce environmental impact of offshore industries are encouraged by
stock market related expectations, Corporate Social Responsibility
reporting (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Gjølberg 2009; Steurer 2010;
Landon-Lane 2018), and the industry’s drive to attain Social License to
Operate (Voyer and van Leeuwen 2019). However, quick fixes and isolated
approaches result in a sizeable number of these efforts being
ineffective or tokenistic (Golden et al. 2017). While international
organisations look to take spatial management beyond simply “open” and
“closed” areas through recognition of Other Effective Area-based
Conservation Measures (OCEMs; e.g. Dudley et al 2018), the divide
between affluent nations and emerging economies in the capacity to
enforce zoning is evident. Moreover, politically motivated
simplification of environmental regulatory constraints at national level
sees sophisticated multiple use zoning degrade to ‘paper parks’ in some
nations. In other nations, a policy vacuum sees slow and haphazard
regulatory action around developments of new offshore industries. These
patterns are slow to reverse and the resulting lack of regulatory
policies factoring in the cost of environmentally damaging behaviours
leads to industry continuing to use the environment as a free resource
and to cynicism that the offshore Blue Economy is little more than ‘blue
washing’ (Voyer and van Leeuwen 2019).
The spatial management and policy environment means offshore waters are
often in effect divided into areas for production and extraction by
individual sectors, and areas for conservation and protection (O’Leary
et al. 2016). With a few exceptions, the spatial divisions mean that
potential opportunities for co-location of industries or other
bio-design inspired synergies are lost, and that the assessment of
cumulative effects is compromised. Minimal investment in monitoring that
is useful at a systematic scale and constrained regulatory budgets
further hamper the assessment and management of impacts, leaving marine
ecosystems exposed to significant risk of degradation (see also Ward et
al. 2020). These limitations play out in different ways for different
sectors. For seabed mining, some countries uphold moratoria in their own
EEZs, as they do now (e.g. New Zealand and Namibia; Levin et al.2016; Ellis et al. 2017). Others undertake explorative mining
with few provisions for rehabilitation of vulnerable marine ecosystems
(Van Dover et al. 2014; Miller et al. 2018).
The value of mineral resources coupled with increasing on-land scarcity
as mineral exporters retain production for domestic use sees a race to
claim resource rich deposits. Countries claim Extended Continental Shelf
(ECS) and expand their territorial right (EEZs) and maritime power to
ensure continued access to offshore resources (Fig. 1; Tian et al. 2019;
Jouffray et al. 2020). Potential for conflicts is high, particularly
where resources extraction is lucrative or control over resources is
strategic (Spijkers et al. 2018; Jouffray et al. 2020). This includes
areas where jurisdictions are shared or under multiple competing
governance structures (O’Higgins et al. 2019; Schatz 2019; Barnes and
Rosello 2020), or where there is an asymmetric power distribution
between countries (Choi 2017). Global naval defence spending continues
to rise for two seemingly separate reasons: expansion of national
political agendas and economic interests; and provision of humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. Naval activities are facilitated by
artificial islands and deep-water refuelling platforms, which slowly
become available to the expanding civilian offshore Blue Economy.
Without firm motivation (whether market, regulatory or societal) there
is a significant risk that developments are characterised by competition
and asymmetric power relations. At present the Blue Economy has great
political capital and legitimacy and it has brought together diverse
sets of actors from across the public, private and non-government
sectors (Winder and Le Heron 2017). However, this political capital
could be damaged if there is no balance between offshore development,
fair redistribution of benefits and environmental protection. If
expectations are not met, the public will become disenfranchised with
offshore Blue Economy outcomes, which could undo any gains and
compromise the offshore sector’s future.
2. More sustainable future
The more sustainable future avoids alienation of the public as the
offshore Blue Economy is characterised by an intentional shift toward
sustainability and equity. First, more thoughtfully balanced production,
where managed growth of some sectors in balanced against de-growth of
other sectors, means that the offshore economy contributes to the
achievement of multiple SDGs. It ensures sustainable use of finite
resources and helps reduce the risk of overshooting planetary boundaries
to do with pollution, climate change and biosphere integrity (Nash et
al. 2017). Second, growth of the circular economy and a reduction in
consumption in high-income countries, which instead redirected their
product to meet increased demand in low-income countries, helps to
minimise over-exploitation of raw resources and address rising global
inequities.
Offshore activity requires considerable research and development to
overcome engineering and operational challenges and mitigate
environmental impacts (Bailey et al. 2014; Kaldellis et al. 2016;
Zanuttigh et al. 2016). A two-stage adaptive-management and
precautionary principle inspired process is implemented to ensure a
structured approach to offshore expansion (towards SDGs 9 and 14; Fig. 2
and table S1).
During the first stage (to 2030), government, industry, and academia
collaborate to understand the impacts and implications of offshore
developments (Zanuttigh et al. 2016). They design monitoring programs
that support developments, provide sufficient information to inform
regulatory bodies, and are affordable for emerging industries. This
collaboration builds on decades of work on shared ocean observation
systems (e.g. Global Ocean Observing System), development of marine
spatial planning (Ehler and Douvere 2009; UNEP & GEF-STAP 2014; Dunstan
et al. 2016; Jones et al. 2016; Santos et al. 2020) and integrated
assessment methods (Korpinen and Andersen 2016). It benefits from
offshore platform investments and R&D in Europe, US, China and
Australia during the 2010s-2020s (e.g. the ENTROPI, OPEC, TROPOS and
MUSICA projects). A proactive focus on cumulative effects and empirical
testing of production and infrastructure technologies helps determine
economic viability, social acceptability, regulatory suitability and
environmental impacts (Durden et al. 2018).
During the second stage (2030 to 2040), pilot projects are evaluated to
determine if and how licences for commercial developments should be
issued, continued or expanded. The assessment is based on data from
monitoring programs that are administered under protocols building off
the FAIR data principles (Wilkinson et al 2016). It considers trigger
points for management intervention that are conservative and acknowledge
uncertainty (Copping et al. 2016). While pilot projects mean a
precautionary approach is taken, the potential for path dependence is
minimised by casting a wide net for different possible technologies and
development types.
Governments ensure equitable use of offshore resources (Bennett et al.
2019) with developments predicated on need and sited for maximum
positive and synergistic outcomes (contributing to SDGs 8, 12, and 16).
Developments are informed by transparent and strategic planning
processes that include large scale marine spatial planning and
systematic ecological and socioeconomic assessments such as those being
developed for multi-use offshore platforms and based on social
acceptance, social cost-benefit and multi-criteria decision analyses
(Chen et al. 2014). In the short term, this means government
incentivises research collaboration and encourages private sector
investment with some government investment directly into major
infrastructure and capacity building. Over time, with adequate policies
and mechanisms in place for equitable benefits sharing
(Cisneros-Montemayor et al 2019; Bateman & Mace 2020), the private
sector may adopt the operating standards of government enterprises.
Monitoring of developments and lease and licencing arrangements is
through national and international institutions, and government
regularly reviews and updates the sectoral operating requirements and
fee structure. Fees are also used to capture economic rents that can be
used to relieve poverty, improve health and well-being, and education
(Lehmann et al 2018).
Greater environmental consciousness, at both the individual and societal
level, is reflected in consumer choices, planning, and other governance
processes. Demand for environmentally friendly operations and products
thus increases (contributing to SDGs 12 and 14) (e.g. Lim et al.2018; Hilger et al. 2019). Some jurisdictions apply economic
penalties to marine products that are not produced sustainably, while in
other locations societal norms see demand for those products decreasing.
At a deeper level, there is a growing recognition that the instrumental
values of the ocean are at risk if environmental values are not
maintained, and that societal costs are associated with environmental
degradation. Technological innovations allow for informed personal
choices on a day-to-day basis and facilitate the engagement with
participatory processes (either consultative or active participation).
This drives a shift to more actively maintaining environmental values,
recognising that a healthy and prosperous society is supported by
healthy ecosystems (Nash et al. 2020b).
Social and environmental responsibility drives more cost effective
private sector engagement with SDGs and sustainability (in particular
SDG 9, 12 and 14). Shareholder dividends account for environmental
externalities which drives competition in the private sector to address
sustainability concerns. Standard auditing practices require businesses
to explicitly show externalities, sustainability, carbon and
biodiversity loss accounting in annual reporting. Their contribution is
measured against wellbeing and environmental stewardship (not just GDP).
Investors increasingly look to these credentials to choose investment
options (Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 2018; UN Global Compact
2020). By 2030 ethical and sustainable investments are standard practice
in more affluent nations and dominate the investment market globally.
Systems of national environmental accounts are integrated into political
decision making alongside economic forecasts, and regularly include
non-monetary and indirect ecosystem flows and function (Bateman & Mace
2020).
Offshore industry is encouraged to collaborate on, and share investment
in, research and innovation and infrastructure (contributing to SDGs 7,
9, 14 and 17). Collaboration allows for faster innovation and delivers
efficient technology that ensures real-time monitoring and minimises
ecological impact for multi-use offshore platforms (Zanuttigh et al.
2016) without compromising the functionality of the infrastructure.
These innovations include bio-design of physical platforms and the
adoption of advanced composite materials that use chemical and
nano-scale properties to inhibit biofouling organisms. Innovation also
aims for zero waste generation and carbon neutral (or even negative)
footprints (Rockström et al. 2017) and provides support for regenerative
practices, such as waste removal or habitat restoration in areas
impacted by past damaging activities (Duarte et al. 2020). Increased
production and uptake of offshore renewables, innovation in energy
storage systems, and co-location of renewable production with other
sectors (Rockström et al. 2017) achieves decarbonisation (see also
Trebilco et al. 2020). By 2030 offshore aquaculture is a major carbon
sequestration industry (Buck et al. 2017; Sondak et al. 2017) and source
of bioenergy (Roesijadi et al. 2008).
There is careful consideration of the impacts of oceanic infrastructure
and decommissioning issues (in line with SDGs 14 and 17) (Bennettet al. 2019; Jouffray et al. 2020). This is both with
respect to policy positions and within integrated life-cycle assessments
(Stuiver et al. 2016). Cooperation between government, society,
industry, and academia leads to agreed and evidence-based measures for
marine environmental protection (e.g. Stuiver et al. 2016).
Management intervention is based on threshold levels that are most
effective. For instance, priority restoration opportunities and
conservation protection (e.g. in corridors, feeding areas, upwelling
zones and breeding grounds) is given to taxonomic groups for which
migration and dispersal patterns are known.
High resolution scientific data are widely available and shared across
sectors and countries (contributing to SDGs 9, 14 and 17). This is
consistent with the United Nation Ocean Compact guidelines for growing
sustainable ocean business. These guidelines stress the need for
industry to actively support and participate in ocean mapping
initiatives and to share existing ocean data (UN Global Compact 2020).
The Global Ocean Observing System provides a platform where ocean data
can be shared and integrated. This platform comes at a cost, estimated
to be roughly from USD 500 million to 1 billion per year (Claudet et al.
2020), but the benefits are cross-sectoral. Efficient information
sharing supports integrated ocean management, speeds up innovation, and
encourages learning (e.g. Winther et al 2020). It reduces the individual
costs of socioeconomic assessments, Environmental Impact Assessments and
planning processes, and can accelerate action and sustainable solutions.
For example, accurate estimates on the environmental cost of activities
become available as more companies report their performance on carbon
and plastic management (UNEP 2014; Beaumont et al. 2019). These
estimates show that, for the first time in 10-15 years, global marine
environmental degradation costs drop below USD 13 billion per year (UNEP
2014) as a direct result of a reduction in pressure on inshore waters
and a structured and sustainable approach to moving activities offshore.
Cooperation between international institutions and governments helps
shift the geopolitical emphasis to sustainable use of shared offshore
resources (towards SDG 16). Naval military expenditure initially remains
high (Tian et al. 2019), but then slows after naval modernisation by the
world’s major naval powers. The tension that both motivated and resulted
from the modernisation, reduces over time as geopolitical processes
increasingly support conflict resolution and shared management. In
addition, a move away from fossil fuels reduces interest in the oil rich
reserves of the South China Sea. Capital investments by powerful nations
focus on a small number of high-tech mobile platforms that also support
data streams for monitoring, reporting and compliance around offshore
activities and have the potential to benefit humanitarian relief
efforts. For example, mobile platforms may help establish secure and
reliable communication networks in disaster zones, or act as offshore
rescue and aid stations.
Global collaborations are fostered by the shared need for technological
innovation, integrated monitoring, and recognition that offshore
developments can address multiple SDGs (in line with SDG 17).
Cooperation and knowledge sharing between land-based, coastal and
offshore industries leads to a more accurate assessment of the
cumulative impacts arising from the interaction between land and marine
processes and encourages effective governance structures (Boschetti et
al. 2020). Societal expectations around the development of new
opportunities, sustainability, and equity are met. People are proud to
be a part of this future.
Pathway towards a more
sustainable offshore Blue Economy
1. Required changes
Achieving our vision of a more sustainable future in 2030 will require
four important changes. The first is a shift in the expression of
societal values towards sustainable consumption and production, and
environmental justice and consciousness (e.g. shared costs and benefits
of ocean use across uses, nations and generations). The Bruntland
definition of sustainable development (1987) captures the generational
dimension of this, where “sustainable development is development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs”. But this definition can be
paraphrased to capture also the current user and nation dimensions,
where sustainable development is development that meets our own needs
without compromising the needs of other users and nations. This involves
working with communities to understand how different values may compete
or interact and what may be preventing sustainable or equitable actions.
The second change is that the scale and allocation of funding to
offshore Blue Economy activities are appropriate and ensure long-term
sustainable and equitable financing. The third change is that
information sharing between industries and across nations is enhanced
and the focus shifts from competition to cooperation. The fourth change
is that international legal and institutional mechanisms are implemented
for ethical sharing of benefits, sustainable exploitation and conflict
resolution (see also Smith et al. 2020). This also means that minority
and often marginalised groups, such as Indigenous and Traditional
Peoples, are included in offshore Blue Economy planning processes and
contribute knowledge on sustainable practices and ways of life, in line
with international instruments (e.g. UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples) (Fischer et al. 2020).
In the next sections we discuss specific actions needed to achieve the
four required changes (Fig 3). Actions are numbered and numbers refer to
Table S2, where more details on each action and its relation to drivers,
SDGs and the sustainable future are given.
Some of the actions we propose are applicable across different
challenges and systems, but they are particularly relevant in achieving
a sustainable offshore Blue Economy. Historical and current trajectories
for land and coastal systems show that often these actions have not been
proactively undertaken to the extent needed (e.g. Caswell et al. 2020).
This has resulted in over-industrialisation and depletion, which are
conditions difficult to reverse. In contrast, the offshore Blue Economy
is emerging. It offers the rare opportunity to drive development and
conservation from implementation rather than having to redress past
mistakes, and thus to design a future that encompass innovative concepts
(e.g. SDGs, circular and balanced economies). The offshore Blue Economy
also poses new challenges. Offshore waters are a remote and unknown
space, thus actions applicable across systems will need to be tailored
to new needs and to account for a general lack of knowledge.
a. Shift in the expression of societal values
To shift societal values, national governments, the education sector,
NGOs and industry need to work collaboratively to implement school and
societal awareness and education programs (Fig 3) (Kelly et al. 2020;
Claudet et al. 2020). These programs should be combined with immersive
experiences that include, for example, participation in hands-on
workshops and game-based training for enhanced engagement and learning
(Dede 2009). They shift the public perception of offshore developments
from being a distant possibility to being part of their future as
custodians of the planet. They inform the public that offshore
development is already happening, that offshore platforms are becoming
reality, and that now is the time to steer industries in a desired
direction. They demonstrate that the instrumental values of offshore
areas are not indefinitely resilient and that ‘out of sight’ must not be
‘out of mind’ (Fig. 3; action No. 30 and 34 in Table S2) (Jamieson
2008).
Academia needs to increase understanding of the
environment-economy-society interdependencies and sustainable actions,
as this information is key in developing education programs (action 31
and 40). Education programs should focus on interdisciplinarity to allow
integration of different knowledge for the diverse components of the
marine environment. The current tendency to bias natural science should
be avoided and true integration of social sciences should be the
ultimate aim (Alexander et al. 2018, Fortunato et al. 2018). Education
programs should also promote environmental justice, reduction of
resource consumption and sustainable choices, and in turn create
realistic social expectations about emerging offshore industries
(actions 32, 36, 38 and 39) (Jamieson 2008; Ripple et al. 2019).
Media that provides room for responsible reflection and respectful
dialog can help facilitate this process.
A society that is supported to think critically will call for reporting
and regulatory requirements that consider environmental externalities
and contribution to wellbeing (actions 6 and 41). It will also raise the
standards of industry’s Social License to Operate (SLO), and thus demand
for greater industry transparency, social responsibility and
environmental stewardship. Industry, in turn, needs to increase the
focus on achieving SLO and delivering on transparency, responsibility
and environmental goals (action 41). It needs to go beyond tokenism and
engage with society in a collaborative and genuine manner (actions 33,
37, and 41) (Harvey and Bice 2014; Ripple et al. 2019; Voyer and
van Leeuwen 2019). Innovative and responsible industries need to lead by
example. For instance, innovative offshore aquaculture industries should
explore Integrated Multi-Trophic Aquaculture (IMTA) and ecosystem
aquaculture (Chopin 2013), given the shortcomings of many land based
monocultural systems. Investors need to continue to grow ethical and
responsible investments and better account for environmental impacts as
part of their risk management strategies.
More generally, society, international organisations, and national
governments need to reconsider legislative and policy goals and metrics,
moving towards reporting a broader set of environmental and wellbeing
goals and indicators (action 6) (Bennett et al. 2019). As a first
step, no human (or country) should be forced to put short term interests
(e.g. provide for family basic needs) ahead of long term interests (e.g.
maintain the instrumental value of the ocean; Hardin 1968) (action 35).
Social, institutional and political changes need to stem from
collaboration between society, national governments, and international
organisations to determine equitable access rights and benefit
redistribution from offshore activities both within and between nations
(action 3, 4 and 5) (Bennett et al. 2019). In such context, criteria to
determine beneficiaries may include, for example, the community’s
dependence on the ocean, distance from the ocean and cultural connection
to the ocean. This is noting that any action dealing with mechanisms to
support equity or with ways of achieving sustainability by adopting
alternative economic models sits centrally within broader discussions,
for example on environmental justice, that society has to have. Rapidly
progressing these discussions in the next decade is fundamental and
achievable, but reaching agreements may require longer times (see also
‘risks and path dependency of actions’).
Meanwhile, concrete actions towards more equitable Blue Economy outcomes
are possible. For instance, government, academia and industry need to
ensure that technological advances not only address engineering and
operational solutions to offshore developments but also environmental
and equity solutions. Such solutions could include innovative
aquaculture and energy production systems and legislative requirements
that enable smaller scale and less developed countries access to
offshore developments (action 5; Stead 2019).
b. Sustainable and equitable financing
Following deliberations, mechanisms that improve and ensure long-term
sustainable and equitable financing need to be implemented (action 1)
(Thiele and Gerber 2017; Jouffray et al. 2019; Laffoley et al. 2019;
Ripple et al. 2019). Financial mechanisms to capture the net social
benefit from developments should be progressive, with greater demands on
high return and high-impact sectors (action 2). Part of the funds
generated from these mechanisms need to be redirected to ensure
redistribution of benefits beyond national boundaries (actions 3 and 4).
This is of particular importance when moving from an EEZ and
country-centric focus to globally redistributing benefits from the use
of the high seas (and the Area). The remaining funds should be allocated
to fair redistribution of benefits within nations (actions 1, 2, 4 and
5), research and development that support monitoring and clean,
efficient, multi-sectoral offshore uses (e.g. platforms; actions 8, 10,
28 and 51), and environmental impact mitigation and rehabilitation
(actions 15 and 18) (Bebbington et al. 2019; Jouffray et al. 2019;
Ripple et al. 2019; Duarte et al. 2020).
Innovative financing mechanisms and supplementary sources of funds also
need to be explored and put in place to speed up technological
innovation and uptake (actions 19, 23-25) (Thiele and Gerber 2017;
Laffoley et al. 2019; Wabnitz & Blasiak 2019; Claudet et al. 2020).
Innovative financing mechanisms may include blue bond and blended
finances (Thiele and Gerber 2017; Fritsch 2020). Supplementary sources
of funds may include stakeholder donations and private fundraising,
crowdfunding for offshore investment and installations, and
contributions from large private organisations, such as internet portals
investing in ocean monitoring (e.g. Google Ocean). For example,
voluntary and regulatory financing frameworks that support the
restoration of coastal blue carbon ecosystems, such as mangroves and
seagrasses (Vanderklift et al 2019), can be extended to finance
large-scale aquaculture plants that act as major carbon sequestration
sites (and that generate carbon credit). The non-carbon co-benefits
associated with offshore aquaculture plants, including food and
bioenergy production, provide opportunity to attract investors and
generate additional financial support (Vanderklift et al 2019). This
opportunity is maximized when the aquaculture industry is efficiently
linked to other industries, within an offshore platform context. As
proposed for coastal systems, actions to generate the appropriate type
and scale of financial investments include an analysis of the motivation
of potential investors, the development of demonstration projects and
linked risk management strategies, and a customization of the final
product to meet the local environmental, socioeconomic, and regulatory
context (Vanderklift et al 2019).
While the current decade will see the start of offshore development with
initial emphasis primarily on food and energy systems, larger multi-use
developments including offshore ports, housing and transportation hubs
are being touted. However, the need to structure new growth developments
that are both sustainable and within planetary boundaries (Steffen et al
2015; Nash et al 2017) has led to a rethinking of global economies (e.g.
Kallis et al 2012). The offshore Blue Economy has the potential to
develop and embrace emerging societal concerns of over-exploitation and
inefficient use of natural resources. For example, offshore leases can
be offered to operators that buy out inshore food or energy quotas and
thus enhance the restoration of coastal systems. Likewise, they could be
offered to operators that recycle high percentages of materials
throughout the production and supply chains of their businesses.
c. Information sharing
To foster information sharing, international organisations, national
governments, industry, and academia need to collaborate (Laffoley et al.
2019; Pearlman et al. 2019; Claudet et al. 2020), and maximise
transferability through data standards (Fig 3). Shared information
should be used to develop robust planning processes and Environmental
Impact Assessments (action 27) (UNEP & GEF-STAP 2014; Durden et al.
2018). Data collection and sharing may require expensive technologies,
such as artificial intelligence driven autonomous underwater vehicles
and real time data visualisation dashboards (action 10) (Mayer 2006;
Yoerger et al. 2007). Shared data should incorporate life-cycle
assessment of infrastructure including the shared benefit (or impact) of
co-location, the logistical and operational footprint, and information
about biodiversity impacts of removal versus re-purposing (action 17).
Biodiversity consideration should include biosecurity aspects, such as
new infrastructures acting as an invasion stepping stone or as protected
habitat for sedentary species (action 17). Sharing information should
allow industry planners to make rapid and well-informed decisions and
thus streamline assessment and approval processes (action 26) (Pearlman
et al. 2019).
National governments and international organisations need to centrally
house all publicly funded data and make it easily accessible (action
29). The costs of the data warehouse process for businesses should be
recognised as legitimate business costs (i.e. deductibles) and partly
covered by small purchases, where data users can access some data and
functionality freely but must pay for additional aspects (action 29).
The scope of international organisations that collect data on ocean
economic activities, such as those for deep sea mining and transport and
trade (e.g. the International Seabed Authority, the World Trade
Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation), needs to be
expanded to include all sectors and countries. The aim is to facilitate
and regulate collection and integration of this data and, most
importantly, to encourage knowledge exchange which supports integrated
ocean management and innovation (action 20; Winther et al. 2020). There
is a need to establish clear guidelines on how to achieve knowledge
exchange while protecting Intellectual Property that are enforced by
national regulators (action 21; UN Global Compact 2020; Claudet et al.
2020).
To foster collaborations across countries and industries, international
organisations, national governments, and academia need to run national
and international summits and support clusters of collaborators (e.g.
the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, and the World
Ocean Council) (actions 44, 45, 47, 48). Options for web-based summits
should be encouraged and remote participation seen as an opportunity for
increasing or diversifying attendance while reducing carbon
contribution. This has already been witnessed in many international
meetings held during COVID-19 restrictions, where attendees who would
normally be blocked by finances, disabilities or local commitments could
attend. The opportunities for collaboration will allow players to share
their lessons learned, and in particular between established and
emerging sectors. They will provide a way to find hidden opportunities
and financial incentives for sectors to co-develop small and large scale
offshore infrastructure, such as major platforms or energy arrays (e.g.
by-products of one sector may solve the needs of another sector)(actions
9, 49 and 51-53).
The commercial focus throughout the 2010s has been on large
infrastructure, with little input from Indigenous and Traditional
Peoples. The introduction of respect, recognition and understanding of
Indigenous ways of life within the offshore Blue Economy could see a
multitude of alternative options emerge (Claudet et al. 2020; Vincent et
al 2020), with the potential for blending of modern manufacturing
technology with traditional practices (Fischer et al. 2020).
d. International legal and institutional mechanisms
International organisations, national governments, society, and academia
need to improve, ratify, and enforce existing international agreements
that promote ethical sharing of benefits and shift the geopolitical
emphasis to sustainable exploitation (e.g. the Convention on Biological
Diversity; UN General Assembly 1982; Bennett et al. 2019;
Laffoley et al. 2019) (13 and 42). Such improved agreements should 1)
include resource sharing contracts between countries; 2) set
international standards around industry behaviour (e.g. sustainable food
and green transport certifications; action 12 and 50); and 3) set
stringent requirements on licencing arrangements for exploration and
their enforcement in EEZs (action 7). Requirements should include
regulations on financing mechanisms, reflect uncertainty with respect to
Environmental Risk Assessments, promote economic activities with a focus
on mitigation and restoration (Duarte et al. 2020), low or zero carbon
emissions and energy self-sufficiency or excess production (actions 11,
15 and 16). Achieving this collaborative outcome demands high-level
coordination among institutions and international agreements.
It also requires a careful consideration of power imbalances that might
influence negotiations between countries and sectors (Bateman & Mace
2020; Vincent et al 2020). International and regulatory bodies for
conflict resolution, such as the International Court of Justice, need to
be bound by rules designated to mitigate these imbalances (action 43).
Power dynamics need to be considered at multiple levels and, when
possible, before they result in conflicts that require legal resolution.
This includes, for example, regulating power dynamics that emerge during
meetings involving several sectors with contrasting interests (e.g.
Bateman & Mace 2020). Small scale examples of conflict resolution and
mediation techniques are readily available, but novel approaches such as
a different design of meetings that, for instance, dismantle
hierarchical set ups (Colvin et al. 2016) may provide useful launch
points for new approaches (action 46).
2. Key actors and time frame of actions
Achieving our vision of a more sustainable future in 2030 is a
collaborative and interdisciplinary effort that see all actors playing
an important part in success. It also requires a coordinated and prompt
start on actions that will need to be revised and continued until or
beyond 2030. There are however actors that will be more influential in
implementing a specific set of actions and actions that can be
implemented before others (Fig. 3). For instance, most of the actions
that we propose to foster information sharing can be implemented with a
short to medium time frame (before 2025), and industry and international
organisations will play an important role in their achievement. An
example of these actions is to increase collaboration between
established and emerging sectors of the offshore Blue Economy and
between these sectors and the land and coastal ones so that lessons
learned can be transferred (action 48).
Similarly, most actions ensuring sustainable and equitable financing can
be implemented with a medium time frame (around 2025), with national
governments, industry and other investors being the key actors. Examples
are to enhance economic tools on high-impact and high-income sectors and
to increase financing mechanisms that support activities with clear
environmental and social benefits (actions 2 and 23). Instead, actions
that promote a shift in the expression of societal values can be
achieved at different times during the Ocean Decade (2021-2030) but
mostly fall within the medium to long term category (after 2025). Civil
society and the broad education sector enable this change. Last, actions
dealing with international legal and institutional mechanisms will
require longer time frames (by 2030) and their realization will mostly
depend on national governments and international organisations. These
actions include, for example, to grant licences for economic activities
in offshore waters based on equity and sustainability criteria (e.g.
zero waste generation and carbon neutral footprints; Buck et al 2017;
Rockström et al. 2017).
3. Risk and path dependency of actions
Business as usual is not the worst possible future. It is a future that
sees improvements compared to the present situation, but that does not
live up to the greater potential of the more sustainable alternative.
There are risks involved in choosing a more sustainable future over
business as usual. Consideration of these risks should assess whether
the additional effort required in taking an action is justified; if it
is a significant cost, does it lead to substantial or only marginal
gain? Our pathway towards a more sustainable future does not guarantee
the outcome because of potential risks along the way, but considering
these risks substantially increases potential for improved outcomes.
Negotiations and deliberations on the allocation of rights and
redistribution of benefits from offshore activities may lead to
political polarization and conflicts (Nie 2003). Some societies may want
to defend their existing rights and refuse to accept what they perceive
as an unjust redistribution of rights and benefits (Jamieson 2008).
Political conflicts over offshore resources may intensify once their
true value becomes apparent. Countries may refuse to respect
international agreements, and international bodies that are responsible
for regulation may instead foster collusion. Discussions on the
allocation of rights and redistribution of benefits from offshore
activities may continue for decades.
Authorities may fail to agree on reporting standards or to properly
enforce international and national regulations around financing
mechanisms, data, and knowledge sharing. This may undermine the intent
and outcome of any new regulation (Galaz et al. 2018). For example, the
lack of transparency in the taxation process and use of tax havens may
lead to consistent losses in tax revenues, and in turn weaken social and
environmental investments (Galaz et al. 2018). Similarly, countries and
industries may provide poor quality data to protect commercial interests
or for political reasons. Data confidentiality (or even formats) may
continue to be a barrier to data sharing and management. This may hamper
collaboration and development.
International requirements on exploration and initial licencing phases
to ensure a structured approach to development may instead lead to
inertia, disagreement over intent and regulatory capture (e.g. through
disproportionate influence of lobby groups on regulatory outcomes; Dal
Bó 2006). International requirements may inadvertently reduce investment
and innovation and slow uptake of technologies and research and
development, ultimately resulting in path dependency and a lack of
critical mass essential for involvement.
All of these represent real risks in achieving a sustainable future. The
choice society faces is to take actions involving known risks towards an
aspirational future or to continue down a route of least resistance that
will lead to a less desirable future (business as usual).